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PEOPLE v. PATTERSON: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NEW YORK'S
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF EXTREME
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE
INTRODUCTION
Section 125.25(1)(a) of the New York Penal Law provides
that in any prosecution for intentional murder, it is an affirmative
defense, reducing the crime of murder to manslaughter in the first
degree, that the accused "acted under the influence of extreme
emotional disturbance" which could be reasonably explained or ex-
cused.' The Penal Law further provides that when an affirmative
defense is raised at trial, the accused has the burden of establishing
such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.2
Whether a state may constitutionally place the burden of per-
suasion3 upon the defendant to prove the mitigating factor of ex-
treme emotional disturbance has been questioned in the aftermath
of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Mullaney v. Wilbur.4
There, the Court held that when a defendant attempts to reduce a
I N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1975). The statute provides that to establish
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance it must be shown that: "The de-
fendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant
believed them to be." Id.
I Id. § 25(2). For a general discussion of affirmative defenses in New York, see Comment,
Affirmative Defenses Under New York's New Penal Law, 19 SYRACUSE L. REV. 44 (1967). The
New York Penal Law distinguishes between ordinary and affirmative defenses. Although the
prosecution has "the burden of disproving [a] defense beyond a reasonable doubt," N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 25(1) (McKinney 1975), the burden of production, see note 3 infra, is on the
defendant. See People v. Steele, 26 N.Y.2d 526, 528, 260 N.E.2d 527, 528, 311 N.Y.S.2d 889,
891 (1970).
There exist two types of "burdens of proof" on a given issue in any trial, one being the
burden of production, the other the burden of persuasion. The former, sometimes called the
burden of going forward with the evidence, requires the party upon whom it is cast to either
produce some evidence that a triable question of fact exists or face an adverse ruling by the
judge, generally a directed verdict or denial of instructions to the jury. See C. MCCORMICK,
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 336, at 783-84 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; Comment,
Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses in the Texas Penal Code, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 120,
121 (1976). The burden of production may be satisfied either by evidence introduced by the
party with that burden or by evidence contained in the adversary's case. See People v. Steele,
26 N.Y.2d 526, 528-29, 260 N.E.2d 527, 528, 311 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (1970). In contrast, the
burden of persuasion requires the party on whom it is placed to convince the trier of fact that
the alleged fact is true. See MCCORMICK, supra, § 336, at 783-84.
421 U.S. 684 (1975).
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felonious homicide from murder to manslaughter by properly rais-
ing the issue of heat of passion on sudden provocation, it is violative
of due process to place the burden of persuasion as to that issue
upon the accused.' Since heat of passion, in both form and sub-
stance, is the common law precursor to New York's modern reduc-
tive factor of extreme emotional disturbance,6 some New York
courts, including two trial tribunals7 and the Appellate Division,
Fourth Department,8 had concluded that section 125.25(1) (a) is void
in light of Mullaney.' This issue reached the New York Court of
Id. at 704.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20, commentary at 391, 393 (McKinney 1975); Gegan,
Criminal Homicide in the Revised New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y.L.F. 565, 569-70 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Gegan].
I People v. Woods, 84 Misc. 2d 301, 375 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1975);
People v. Balogun, 82 Misc. 2d 907, 372 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975).
8 People v. Davis, 49 App. Div. 2d 437, 376 N.Y.S.2d 266 (4th Dep't 1975).
Similarly, the Delaware affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, which
functioned in the same manner as New York's statute, was found unconstitutional in light of
Mullaney by that state's supreme court. Fuentes v. State, 349 A.2d 1 (Del. 1975).
In New York, other affirmative defenses besides extreme emotional disturbance have
been challenged following Mullaney. For example, several lower courts have entertained
attacks upon the affirmative defense of entrapment contained in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.05
(McKinney 1975). Such challenges, however, have generally proved unsuccessful. See, e.g.,
People v. Schwartz, 175 N.Y.L.J. 97, Nov. 19, 1975, at 10, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Kings County);
People v. Hawkins, 84 Misc. 2d 201, 374 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1975); People
v. Long, 83 Misc. 2d 14, 372 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1975). See also Note, The
New York Penal Law's Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 27 SYRAcusE L. REv.
834, 861-64 (1976) [hereinafter cited as New York Affirmative Defenses]. Prior to Mullaney,
the court of appeals had upheld the constitutionality of the affirmative defense of entrapment
in People v. Laietta, 30 N.Y.2d 68, 281 N.E.2d 157, 330 N.Y.S.2d 351, cert. denied, 407 U.S.
923 (1972).
The constitutionality of N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.15(4) (McKinney 1975), which permits
an individual accused of robbery in the first degree to reduce the crime to second degree
robbery if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that any firearm used was unloaded
or inoperable, has also been attacked. Three lower courts have sustained the statute, People
v. McDonald, 50 App. Div. 2d 907, 377 N.Y.S.2d 988 (2d Dep't 1975) (mem.); People v.
Langella, 175 N.Y.L.J. 105, June 1, 1976, at 9, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County); People v.
Archie, 85 Misc. 2d 243, 380 N.Y.S.2d 555 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1976), while two courts have
held the law unconstitutional, People v. White, 86 Misc. 2d 803, 383 N.Y.S.2d 800 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1976); People v. Smith, 85 Misc. 2d 1, 380 N.Y.S.2d 569 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1976). White and Smith were subsequently overruled, however, by the Appellate Division,
First Department, in People v. Rodriguez, 52 App. Div. 2d 781, 383 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1st Dep't
1976), wherein the court found the assertion that § 160.15(4) was unconstitutional as a result
of Mullaney to be without merit. In a subsequent case, the first department, without referring
to Rodriguez, reaffirmed its view that § 160.15(4) is not unconstitutional in light of Mullaney
and Patterson. See People v. Cwikla, 54 App. Div. 2d 80, 387 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1st Dep't 1976).
Prior to Mullaney, this affirmative defense was sustained in People v. Player, 80 Misc. 2d
177, 362 N.Y.S.2d 773 (County Ct. Suffolk County 1974).
The affirmative defense to felony murder provided by N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25(3)
(McKinney 1975) has also withstood an attack based on Mullaney. People v. Kampshoff, 53
App. Div. 2d 325, 385 N.Y.S.2d 672 (4th Dep't 1976); note 62 infra.
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Appeals in People v. Patterson," where the state's highest court, by
a 4-3 majority, upheld the constitutionality of section 125.25(1) (a)."
This Comment will examine Patterson and attempt to analyze the
decision in light of Mullaney and other Supreme Court precedents.
Mullaney v. Wilbur: REFINEMENT OF THE REASONABLE-DOUBT
STANDARD
While the requirement that the prosecution must prove the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is deeply engrained in
American criminal law, it was not until the recent case of In re
Winship 3 that this standard was given recognition as being
constitutionally mandated. In Winship, the Supreme Court held
that to place any lesser burden of proof on the prosecution would
offend due process. 4 The Court noted two critical interests that
require utilization of the reasonable-doubt standard in criminal
cases. First, the reasonable-doubt standard effectively reduces the
possibility of convictions based on factual errors. This affords the
accused strong protection against the loss of liberty and social stig-
matization which could result from a wrongful conviction. 5 Second,
the Court found this standard to be "indispensable" in achieving
"the respect and confidence of the community in applications of the
criminal law."1 Any lesser burden of persuasion would dilute the
"moral force of the criminal law" and foster public suspicion as to
whether an innocent person had been wrongly convicted. 7
Against the due process backdrop of Winship, the Supreme
10 39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, prob. juris. noted, 97 S. Ct. 52
(1976).
39 N.Y.2d at 304, 347 N.E.2d at 908, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); W. LA
FAVE & A. Sco'rr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 8, at 44 (1972).
.3 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In Winship, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide the
constitutionality of a New York statutory provision which permitted a juvenile to be adjudged
a delinquent upon facts established by a preponderance of the evidence.
" Id. at 364.
, Id. at 363-64. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), the Court, in dicta, stated:
There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding,
which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest
of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is
reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of...
persuading the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the
Government has borne the burden of. . . convincing the factfinder of his guilt.
Id. at 525-26, quoted in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
' 397 U.S. at 364.
17 Id.
[Vol. 51:158
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Court in Mullaney"8 was called upon to decide the constitutionality
of a Maine penal statute that placed the burden of persuasion on
the issue of heat of passion in a murder prosecution upon the
defendant. The Mullaney trial court instructed the jury that all
killings done unlawfully, i.e., without justification or excuse, and
intentionally,'9 constituted the crime of felonious homicide."0 Pur-
suant to Maine law, the punishment accorded a person convicted
of felonious homicide depended upon whether the killing was com-
mitted with malice aforethought. 2 A finding of malice aforethought
was considered to mean that the homicide had not been committed
in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation.2  In such case, the
Is In Mullaney, as a result of a fatal beating he administered to one Claude Hebert,
Stillman E. Wilbur, Jr. was convicted of murder. At trial, Wilbur claimed that he attacked
Hebert because Hebert had made homosexual advances towards him. The defense argued
that Wilbur had not committed an unlawful homicide because Wilbur did not have the
requisite criminal intent. In the alternative, it was contended that Wilbur was guilty of no
more than manslaughter because he had killed in the heat of passion provoked by Hebert's
sexual overtures. 421 U.S. at 685.
,1 The trial court defined an intentional homicide as a killing done with an intent to
cause death or an intent to cause serious physical injury. Id. at 685 n.2.
1 Id. at 691. Murder and manslaughter had been defined in separate sectioqs of the
Maine criminal code. The murder statute provided: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being
with malice aforethought, either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished
by imprisonment for life." Ch. 130, § 1, [1954] Me. Laws 127 (repealed 1975). Maine's
manslaughter statute provided in relevant part: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being
in the heat of passion, on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought
...shall be punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more
than 20 years . . . ." Ch. 262, § 3, [1961] Me. Laws 307 (repealed 1975).
Despite these two distinct statutory definitions of murder and manslaughter, Maine's
highest court had held that each provision was merely a separate punishment category within
the general crime of felonious homicide. See State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 662-63 (Me.
1973).
2, 421 U.S. at 686. As it developed generally at common law, malice aforethought came
to consist of two separate elements, one positive and one negative. See Gegan, A Case of
Depraved Mind Murder, 49 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 417, 430 n.50 (1975). The positive factor,
"man-endangering-state-of-mind," required
either (1) an intent to kill, or (2) an intent to inflict great bodily injury, or (3) the
wanton and wilful disregard of an unreasonable human risk-the wilful doing of an
act under such circumstances that there is obviously a plain and strong likelihood
that death or great bodily injury may result, or (4) if the person [was] engaged at
the time in perpetrating or attempting a felony, or in resisting a lawful attempt to
make an arrest or to suppress a riot or an affray, it [included] the wilful doing of
any act which [involved] a substantial element of human risk-with the addi-
tional explanation that the common experience of men shows such a risk to be
inherent in certain felonies such as arson, burglary, rape and robbery.
Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 568-69 (1934) (footnotes
omitted). The negative aspect consisted of the absence of justification, excuse, or mitigation.
Id. at 569. The burden or persuasion as to both the positive and negative aspects lay with
the prosecution. 421 U.S. at 685.
2 In Maine, the requisite malice aforethought could be either express or implied. See
1976]
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homicide would be punished as murder. 3 If the accused established,
however, that he acted in the heat of passion upon sudden provoca-
tion, then the homicide would be punished as voluntary
manslaughter. 4 The prosecution was aided in this respect by a pre-
sumption of malice aforethought which arose once the state had
proven beyond a reasonable doubt the required elements of the
crime, intent and unlawfulness. 5 To rebut this presumption and
reduce the crime of homicide to manslaughter, the defendant was
required to establish heat of passion upon sudden provocation by a
preponderance of the evidence. 6
Justice Powell, speaking for a unanimous Court, held that "the
Due Process clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provoca-
tion when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case. 127 The
Court determined that the interests found vital in Winship, namely,
reduction of the threat of erroneous convictions based on factual
errors and the fostering of public respect for the criminal justice
system,2 18 were endangered by Maine's allocation of the burden of
proof on the issue of heat of passion provocation to the defendant. 21
In its argument, Maine contended that its statute did not vio-
note 20 supra. Express malice aforethought consisted of a premeditated design to cause death.
See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 686 n.4 (1975). Malice aforethought was implied where
the defendant did not act in the heat of passion on sudden provocation during an intentional
(or criminally reckless) and unlawful killing. Id. at 686. As the Mullaney Court noted,
"express malice aforethought was surplusage since if the homicide resulted from sudden
provocation it was manslaughter; otherwise it was murder." Id. at 693 n.15. In short, at the
time of Mullaney, the term malice aforethought in Maine indicated merely absence of an act
committed in heat of passion on sudden provocation. See notes 63-81 and accompanying text
infra.
421 U.S. at 686.
24 Id. at 686-87. The trial court in Mullaney instructed the jury that heat of passion
meant that at the time of the killing "[an individual's] reason is disturbed or obscured by
passion to an extent which might [make] ordinary men of fair, average disposition liable to
act irrationally without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion rather than judg-
ment." Id. at 687 n.5. For a discussion of what constituted adequate provocation in Maine,
see text accompanying notes 93-94 infra. For a general discussion of heat of passion on sudden
provocation, see R. MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 65-86 (1952).
1 421 U.S. at 686. For a discussion of the presumption of malice aforethought, see note
67 and accompanying text infra.
26 421 U.S. at 691-92.
Id. at 704. While the Court held that the burden of persuasion could not be shifted to
the defendant on the question of heat of passion, it did assert that a state could place the
burden of going forward with the evidence on that issue, see note 3 supra, on the defendant.
421 U.S. at 701-02 n.28. For a detailed discussion of this aspect of Mullaney, see Evans v.
State, 28 Md. App. 640, -, 349 A.2d 300, 350-54 (Ct. Spec. App. 1975).
See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
421 U.S. at 698.
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late the dictates of Winship since heat of passion was not a "fact
necessary to constitute" the crime of felonious homicide, but was
relevant only to the punishment the accused would receive after
being found guilty of the crime." In support of this position, the
state asserted that the presumption of malice aforethought attached
only after the defendant had been adjudged guilty of committing
the elements constituting the lesser crime of manslaughter. Thus,
prior to the presumption becoming operative, the defendant was
already subject to imprisonment and certain of having his reputa-
tion tarnished.3 '
The Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, noting
that it failed to take into account the fact that American criminal
law is concerned with the degree of one's criminal culpability as well
as with the question of "guilt or innocence in the abstract. 3 The
Court stated that the protection of an individual against an erro-
neous conviction for a crime of a higher degree than that which is
warranted is equal in importance to the protection of an individual
against a wholly wrongful conviction.3 3 Justice Powell clearly ex-
pressed the Court's displeasure with the procedure in question,
stating:
Under this burden of proof a defendant can be given a life sentence
when the evidence indicates that it is as likely as not that he
deserves a significantly lesser sentence. This is an intolerable re-
sult in a society where . . . it is far worse to sentence one guilty
only of manslaughter as a murderer than to sentence a murderer
for the lesser crime of manslaughter.34
As an alternative argument, Maine asserted that Winship
should not be applied to the defense in question because of the
difficulties which the prosecution would encounter if forced to ne-
gate a defendant's contention that he had acted in the heat of pas-
sion.35 This argument was apparently based on the so-called "com-
parative convenience" test enunciated many years prior to Winship
in Morrison v. California.3" In an opinion authored by Justice Car-
dozo, the Morrison Court held that the burden of proof on an issue
could be shifted to a defendant in a criminal case if "upon a balanc-
" Id. at 696-97.
3, Id. at 697.
32 Id. at 697-98.
Id. at 698.
3' Id. at 703-04 (emphasis in original).
I Id. at 701.
36 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
19761
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:158
ing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting
of the burden" was found to be helpful to the prosecution without
causing "hardship or oppression" to the defendant. 7
In rejecting this argument, the Mullaney Court impliedly over-
ruled the comparative convenience test as a rationale for shifting
the burden of persuasion onto a defendant.38 Justice Powell con-
cluded that neither placing the burden of proof on the prosecution
with respect to a "fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defen-
dant," such as the existence of heat of passion, nor requiring the
state to undergo the great inconvenience of proving a negative, such
as the absence of sudden provocation, constitutes a "unique hard-
31 Id. at 89. See generally New York Affirmative Defenses, supra note 9, at 855-58;
Osenbaugh, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 ARK. L.
REv. 429, 436-37 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Osenbaugh].
" In a related line of cases dealing with statutory inferences prior to Mullaney, the
comparative convenience doctrine had been rejected. Statutory inferences, or statutory pre-
sumptions as they are sometimes mistakenly called, are legislative enactments which permit
a jury to deduce the existence of one element of a crime upon proof of another element. See
People v. Leyva, 38 N.Y.2d 160, 168-69 n.3, 341 N.E.2d 546, 551-52 n.3, 379 N.Y.S.2d 30, 37
n.3 (1975). The prosecution may thus obtain a conviction without producing any evidence
concerning the inferred fact. While statutory inferences do not technically shift the burden
of production to the defendant, see MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 342, at 803-04, he is compelled
to come forward with some evidence to prevent the jury from employing the inference. See
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
Because an illogical or improbable statutory inference may unfairly relieve the prosecu-
tion of its burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the Supreme
Court has delineated constitutionally required guidelines for such inferences. In so doing, the
Court has ruled that the comparative convenience test, standing alone, does not provide an
acceptable criterion for creating a statutory inference. Id. The Court has held that, at the
very least, the inferred fact must be "more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on
which it is made to depend" for the inference to comply with due process. Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969). But see Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843-46 (1973),
where the Court strongly implied that a stricter test will be used in the future to determine
the constitutionality of statutory inferences. Under this new test, the "evidence necessary to
invoke the inference [must be] sufficient for a rational juror to find the inferred fact beyond
a reasonable doubt." Id. at 843. See generally Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory
Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341 (1970).
While the comparative convenience doctrine has been rejected in statutory inference
cases, it has been utilized by some courts, including the New York Court of Appeals, in
considering the constitutionality of affirmative defenses. The court of appeals has seemingly
ruled that once the prosecution has proven enough facts to support the defendant's culpabil-
ity for the crime charged, it is then equitable to impose upon the defendant the burden of
persuasion with respect to proof of mitigating factors, provided there is a" 'manifest disparity
in convenience of proof amd opportunity for knowledge.'" People v. Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d
75, 84, 305 N.E.2d 461, 466, 350 N.Y.S.2d 369, 376 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974),
quoting Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 91 (1934). See also New York Affirmative Defen-
ses, supra note 9, at 856.
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ship '39 that would justify casting the burden of persuasion on the
defendant.10
People v. Patterson
Factual Background
Marital difficulties between Gordon Patterson and his wife,
Roberta, led her to leave her husband, begin divorce proceedings,
and resume dating a former fiance, John Northrup." Subsequently,
Gordon, after arming himself with a rifle, went to the house of
Roberta's father12 and, upon seeing his wife seminude with her ex-
fiance', killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head.43 Gordon
Patterson thereafter confessed to the homicide and was charged
with second degree murder."
At trial, the defense claimed that the gun had gone off acciden-
tally.45 In the alternative, Patterson claimed as an affirmative de-
fense that he had killed under the influence of extreme emotional
disturbance, and thus, at most, should be convicted of first degree
manslaughter.46 The jury, however, apparently did not accept either
31 Justice Powell noted that the difficulty in proving lack of heat of passion was eased
somewhat "in Maine where the fact at issue is lrgely an 'objective, rather than a subjective,
behavioral criterion.'" 421 U.S. at 702, quoting State v. Rollins, 295 A.2d 914, 920 (Me. 1972).
See notes 93-94 and accompanying text infra. In addition, Justice Powell noted that establish-
ing the absence of heat of passion is similar to "proving any other element of intent; it may
be established by adducing evidence of the factual circumstances surrounding the
commission of the-homicide." 421 U.S. at 702. Earlier in the opinion, Justice Powell noted
that the large majority of states place the burden of persuasion on the issue of heat of passion
on the prosecution. Id. at 696. In regard to the difficulties associated with proving a negative,
Justice Powell observed that Maine law required the prosecution to prove lack of self-defense
when that fact was in issue at a trial. Id. at 702, citing State v. Millet, 273 A.2d 504 (Me.
1971). In the Justice's view, this burden is "in all practical effect. . . identical to the burden
involved in negating the heat of passion on sudden provocation." 421 U.S. at 702.
10 421 U.S. at 701-02. This, of course, does not mean that the Court will not use some
sort of balancing test in the future. Justice Powell stated in Mullaney that the rationale of
Winship "requires an analysis that looks to the 'operation and effect of the law as applied
and enforced by the State,' and to the interests of both the State and the defendant as
affected by the allocation of the burden of proof." Id. at 699, quoting St. Louis S.W. Ry. v.
Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914). It would appear that in the future the Court will weigh
the uniqueness of the hardship on the prosecution with respect to the burden of persuasion
against the interests that Winship seeks to protect. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text
infra.
"1 39 N.Y.2d at 291, 347 N.E.2d at 900, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
42 Id.
43 Id.
" Id. Patterson's confession was ruled voluntary at a pretrial hearing and was entered
into evidence at trial. Id.
, Id. at 292, 347 N.E.2d at 900, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
t' Id. See notes 1-2 and accompanying text supra.
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contention, and instead found the defendant guilty of intentional
murder. 7 On appeal, Patterson's conviction was unanimously af-
firmed by the appellate division,48 and the defendant thereafter
sought review in the court of appeals. While the case was pending
in that court, the Supreme Court released its decision in Mullaney.
Patterson then advanced the argument that Mullaney mandated
reversal of his conviction and a new trial since he had been required
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of extreme
emotional disturbance.49 Finding what it believed to be significant
distinctions between the homicide laws of Maine and New York, the
court of appeals held that New York's affirmative defense of ex-
treme emotional disturbance is not violative of due process, and
hence, concluded that it does not fall within the prohibitions of
Mullaney.5"
Extreme Emotional Disturbance versus Heat of Passion: The
"Collateral" Argument
The Patterson court, in an opinion authored by Judge Jasen,
concluded that the New York murder statute does not violate the
constitutionally required reasonable-doubt standard. The court
"' 39 N.Y.2d at 294, 347 N.E.2d at 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
" People v. Patterson, 41 App. Div. 2d 1028, 344 N.Y.S.2d 836 (4th Dep't 1973), aff d,
39 N.Y.2d 288, 347 N.E.2d 898, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, prob. juris. noted, 97 S. Ct. 52 (1976).
jg 39 N.Y.2d at 294, 347 N.E.2d at 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
Id. at 297, 347 N.E.2d at 904, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 578. Prior to deciding the merits of
Patterson's due process challenge, the court was confronted with two procedural issues. The
first was whether by not challenging at trial the validity of imposing the burden of persuasion
upon him with regard to extreme emotional disturbance, Patterson had failed to preserve a
question of law for the court of appeals. As to this issue, the court observed that it generally
cannot review questions of law arising from alleged trial court error unless the complaining
party makes timely objection in the lower court, thus affording that court an opportunity to
take corrective action. Id. at 294-95, 347 N.E.2d at 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 577. One narrow
exception to this rule is presented, however, when the alleged error "would have affected the
organization of the court or the mode of proceedings proscribed by law." Id. at 295, 347
N.E.2d at 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 577. The court of appeals concluded that Patterson's com-
plaint fell within this exception since the correct allocation of the burden of persuasion in a
criminal trial is a constitutional prerequisite to a properly conducted trial. Id. at 296, 347
N.E.2d at 903, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
The second procedural issue was whether Mullaney should be given retroactive effect.
Id. at 294, 347 N.E.2d at 902, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 576-77. The court reasoned that since In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), discussed in notes 13-17 and accompanying text supra, was
given retroactive effect in Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203 (1972), Mullaney should
likewise be retroactively applied. 39 N.Y.2d at 296, 347 N.E.2d at 903, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
In this respect, it should be noted that the jurisdictions are divided on the question of
Mullaney's retroactivity. Compare Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1975) (Mullaney held to apply retroactively), with State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632,
220 S.E.2d 575 (1975) (Mullaney not retroactive).
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noted that to convict a defendant of murder under New York law,
it is necessary for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant, "with intent to cause the death of another
person," did cause the death of that person or a third person.' To
prove the element of intent, the prosecution must show that it was
the defendant's "conscious objective" to kill the victim. 2 Judge
Jasen concluded that the mitigating circumstance of extreme emo-
tional disturbance does not negate or diminish the intent required
to be proven for a murder conviction. 3 Instead, it "explains the
defendant's intentional action."54 Thus, in the opinion of the court
of appeals, the existence of extreme emotional disturbance is merely
"collateral to the principal facts at issue" and in no way interferes
with the requirement that the state prove the element of intent
beyond a reasonable doubt.5
In contrast, Judge Jasen viewed Maine's mitigating fact of heat
of passion as bearing a relationship to the "facts of intent" in a
homicide prosecution different than that of New York's affirmative
defense of "extreme emotional disturbance." In the Patterson
court's view, Maine's requirement of malice aforethought was "re-
flective of the defendant's intent."" To prove this "fact of intent,"
which, pursuant to Maine law, was not a requisite element of felon-
ious homicide, but rather was relevant only to punishment, the
prosecution was permitted to rely on a presumption of law to estab-
lish malice aforethought. Judge Jasen observed that to negate this
"fact of intent," i.e., the presumption that the defendant's "mind
was possessed by malice," the defendant was required to prove that
he committed the homicidal act in the heat of passion on sudden
provocation." Unlike New York's statutory scheme, where extreme
emotional disturbance is merely "collateral" to and explanative of
the defendant's intent, which must always be fully proven, Maine's
reductive factor of heat of passion, according to the Patterson court,
went directly to the question of degree of intent and made the defen-
dant's acts less intentional.59
39 N.Y.2d at 301-02, 347 N.E.2d at 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 581, discussing N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1975).
1, 39 N.Y.2d at 302, 347 N.E.2d at 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 581, discussing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 15.05(1) (McKinney 1975).
" 39 N.Y.2d at 302, 347 N.E.2d at 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
54 Id.
-1 Id. at 302, 347 N.E.2d at 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82.
"' Id., 347 N.E.2d at 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
57 Id.
59 Id.
59 Id.
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In sum, the court of appeals viewed the Maine homicide statute
struck down in Mullaney as violative of the reasonable-doubt stan-
dard because it presumed a fact of intent necessary to constitute the
crime of murder and required the defendant to establish heat of
passion to negate this element of intent. In contrast, the court deter-
mined that the New York statute required that all the required
elements of intent necessary for a murder conviction be established
by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Jasen thus con-
cluded: "So long as the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, that the defendant intended to kill his victim, it is not a
violation of due process to permit the defendant to establish that
he formulated his intent while 'under the influence of extreme emo-
tional disturbance.' ")60
ANALYSIS OF Patterson
From the language and logic employed by Judge Jasen, it is
clear that the Patterson court interpreted Maine's "malice afore-
thought" requirement as involving an additional substantive fact
of intent existing apart from the essential elements of the crime of
murder, viz., unlawfulness and intent to kill or cause serious injury,
which Maine prosecutors were required to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt." By presuming this additional substantive fact, and by
60 Id. at 303, 347 N.E.2d at 908, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
6! See id. at 302, 347 N.E.2d at 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 582. The foundation for the
Patterson court's interpretation of Maine's malice aforethought requirement appears to lie
in an earlier part of the opinion in which Judge Jasen, after analyzing the history of New
York's murder statutes, concluded:
[Slince 1829, New York has refused to imply malice from the act of killing,
requiring the prosecution to establish, where it seeks to prove murder, that the
defendant possessed a design to effect death. Thus, in Stokes v. People the court
held that "[miere proof of the killing did not as a legal implication, show" that
the defendant committed the killing from a premediated design to effect a human
death. This .. . is in contradistinction to the law of Maine struck down in
Mullaney.
Id. at 299, 347 N.E.2d at 905, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 580 (emphasis added), quoting Stokes v.
People, 53 N.Y. 164, 179-180 (1873). To support this position, Judge Jasen cited a footnote
from Mullaney in which the Supreme Court noted that although the Mullaney trial court had
explained the concept of malice aforethought to the jury as requiring a "premeditated design
to kill," it had also indicated that the prosecution did not have to prove express malice to
obtain a murder conviction "since malice would be implied unless the defendant proved that
he acted in the heat of passion." 421 U.S. at 686 n.4. Judge Jasen also relied upon a prior
opinion rendered by Maine's highest court in which it was stated that the prosecution's failure
to prove premeditation was not fatal to its case in a murder prosecution. 39 N.Y.2d at 299,
347 N.E.2d at 905, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 580, citing State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 665 (Me. 1973).
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the Patterson court believed that the facts necessary
to establish express malice aforethought in Maine were either presumed or implied once an
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placing the burden of persuasion upon the defendant to rebut its
existence by a showing of heat of passion, Maine violated the
reasonable-doubt standard.
Apparently, the Patterson court read Mullaney as holding that
due process prohibits shifting the burden of persuasion on an issue
to the defendant only when proof of that issue controverts a statuto-
rily prescribed element of the crime or, as in Maine, rebuts a sub-
stantive fact relevant to the degree of the defendant's intent. Under
this analysis, casting the burden of persuasion upon a defendant as
to a "collateral" matter-one which negatives no substantive fact
or element, but is applicable only towards decreasing the degree of
culpability-is constitutionally acceptable.62
unlawful and intentional killing was established, thus relieving the prosecution of the burden
of proving a particular fact of intent. However, this was not a correct evaluation of the law
of Maine at the time Mullaney was decided. See notes 68-81 and accompanying text infra.
62 The court of appeals' analysis is reminiscent of the "elements approach" which had
previously been used to determine whether placement of the burden of persuasion on the
defendant with respect to any particular issue violates due process. See Osenbaugh, supra
note 37, at 437-42. The critical factor in this test is whether the affirmative defense that the
accused must prove tends to negate what has been defined as an essential element of the
crime or tends to establish a fact, independent of the essential elements of the crime, which
justifies, excuses, or mitigates the crime. Id. at 439. A good example of this approach may be
found in People v. Bornholdt, 33 N.Y.2d 75, 305 N.E.2d 461, 350 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 905 (1974). There, one of the defendants claimed, inter alia, that New York's
affirmative defense to felony murder, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1975), which
shifted the burden of persuasion to him, was unconstitutional. As support for his contention,
the defendant cited Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001
(1968), wherein the Eighth Circuit found Iowa's alibi affirmative defense to be violative of
due process. In rejecting this argument, the Bornholdt court distinguished Stump by noting
that in Stump the burden was placed on the defendant to negate a basic element of the crime
that the prosecution was required to prove, namely "the defendant's presence at the time and
place of the crime." 33 N.Y.2d at 86, 305 N.E.2d at 467, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 377. In contrast,
the court observed the felony murder affirmative defense does not tend to negate any of the
elements that the prosecution is required to prove to establish the crime charged, but instead,
serves to wholly excuse the defendant from the felony murder charge even where all elements
of the crime are proven. Id., 305 N.E.2d at 467, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78. Subsequent to both
Patterson and Mullaney, at least one court has held that Bornholdt remains valid law. People
v. Kampshoff, 53 App. Div. 2d 325, 340-41, 385 N.Y.S.2d 672, 683 (4th Dep't 1976).
Controlling under the elements approach is whether the particular fact in issue was
intended by the legislature (or in the case of the common law, the courts) to be an essential
element of the crime. See Osenbaugh, supra note 37, at 439-40. As such, the doctrine would
appear to be inapplicable subsequent to Mullaney since there the Supreme Court invalidated
a device which shifted the burden of persuasion on a fact in issue that was not an essential
element of the crime, but rather was relevant only to the punishment to be accorded the
crime. 421 U.S. at 687, 690-92, 698-703. The Patterson court's analysis lends itself to a new
type of approach, one that more properly could be called a "facts approach." In line with
this approach, a shift of the burden of persuasion would be unconstitutional only where the
state designates substantive facts relevant to the question of guilt or to the degree of culpabil-
ity of the accused, and then creates a presumption as to the existence of those facts, requiring
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"Malice Aforethought" Under Maine Law
Crucial to the court of appeals' conclusion that section
125.25(1)(a) does not come within the constitutional prohibitions of
Mullaney was the Patterson court's determination that substantial
differences exist between the mitigation techniques used in the
Maine and New York murder statutes. However, an analysis of
Maine law, as well as of Mullaney itself, discloses that the distinc-
tions between the two states' laws noted by the Patterson court were
based upon an erroneous interpretation of the Maine homicide law.
In so misconstruing the Maine statute, it is submitted that the New
York Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the real import of
Mullaney.
To understand Maine's presumption of malice, as analyzed in
Mullaney, it is necessary to first examine the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine's construction of the phrase "malice aforethought."
In State v. Rollins,63 the Maine high court determined that the
"malice" which is presumed under Maine's homicide law did not
designate "any subjective state of mind existing as a fact," 4 nor did
this presumption show "any probative relationship between the fact
of 'intention' relating to the killing and any further
facts-specifically, whether the fact of intentional killing negates,
more probably than not . . . that the killing was in the heat of
passion . ".6.."'5 The Rollins court held that the presumption of
malice was nothing more than a term chosen by the legislature to
indicate that an unlawful and intentional homicide would incur the
heaviest punishment possible unless mitigated by the existence of
heat of passion." In short, the presumption of malice in Maine was
merely a policy presumption 7 that an illegal homicide was not com-
the defendant to rebut their existence. Such an approach, however, was invalidated in
Mullaney. See notes 82-90 and accompanying text infra.
It is interesting to note that prior to Winship, the Supreme Court employed the elements
approach in upholding an Oregon law that required a defendant claiming insanity to prove
that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795-96, 799
(1952). The Court in Leland did not employ the reasonable-doubt standard in considering
the constitutionality of this statute, but instead used the general due process standard of
determining whether the state's practice "'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Id. at 798, quoting
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
13 295 A.2d 914 (Me. 1972).
" Id. at 920.
" Id. (emphasis in original).
I d.
" The theory behind Maine's presumption of malice was explained by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine when that court had occasion to review the murder conviction
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mitted in the heat of passion on sudden provocation. As such, it was
relevant only insofar as determining the penalty to be imposed on
a defendant; it did not supply any necessary element of the crime.
Shortly after Rollins was decided, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit issued its first opinion in Mullaney."
In the course of its decision, the federal court analyzed the term
"malice aforethought" under Maine law and articulated a definition
strikingly similar to the interpretation subsequently given that ex-
pression by the Patterson court. 9 After reviewing past Maine cases
which had defined the phrase, the First Circuit, rejecting the Maine
high court's interpretation in Rollins,70 determined that malice
aforethought meant premeditation,7 i.e., that the homicide was
considered and reflected upon with a sedate mind in advance of the
act of killing72-a substantive fact relating to the element of intent.
The federal court therefore concluded that since the crime of inten-
tional murder in Maine required a finding of malice aforethought,
which, in the court's opinion, was equivalent to premeditation, the
state could not, in light of Winship, constitutionally shift the bur-
den of persuasion to the defendant to rebut the existence of this
essential element of the crime by a showing of heat of passion.7 3
Subsequently, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in State
v. Lafferty,74 expressly rejected the federal court's interpretation of
involved in Mullaney. The court stated:
The presumption rests upon the foundation of sound public policy. It reflects the
public interest in the administration of justice and recognizes the practical impossi-
bility in a vast number of cases of meeting a mere suggestion of sudden provocation
. . . by negating proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It stems from and accords with
the sacredness of the right to life and the awful responsibility of one who has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have unlawfully and intentionally taken the
life of another.
State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 145 (Me. 1971) (citations omitted), vacated sub nom. Wilbur
v. Robbins, 349 F. Supp. 149 (D. Me. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wilbur v. Mullaney, 473 F.2d
943 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974), aff'd on rehearing, 496 F.2d
1303 (1st Cir.), afrd, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). For an in-depth discussion of Maine's presumption
of malice, see Comment, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of Malice
in Maine, 54 B.U.L. REv. 973 (1974).
" 473 F.2d 943 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 414 U.S. 1139 (1974), af'd on
rehearing, 496 F.2d 1303 (1st Cir.), aff'd, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
" See notes 56-61 and accompanying text supra.
72 See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
7 473 F.2d at 947.
72 This definition was given by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in State v. Merry,
136 Me. 243, 8 A.2d 143, 146 (1939), the case upon which the First Circuit principally relied
in determining the meaning of "malice aforethought" under Maine law. But see notes 75-77
and accompanying text infra.
473 F.2d at 947-48.
7 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973).
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Maine's malice aforethought requirement. Citing language that it
had used in Rollins, the Maine court reiterated its view that the
term connoted no substantive fact of intent. 5 The Lafferty court
held that Maine law did not rely on a presumption of premeditation
to establish "an essential element of unlawful homicide punishable
as murder."7 As such, the court impliedly reasserted the view it had
taken in Rollins, that the presumption of malice was in effect no
more than a policy presumption that a criminal homicide had not
been committed in the heat of passion.77
After Lafferty was decided, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Mullaney and summarily remanded the case
to the First Circuit for reconsideration in light of Lafferty." The
First Circuit, adopting on remand the Supreme Judicial Court's
interpretation of Maine's homicide law, nevertheless found the law
to be violative of due process.7" When Mullaney reached the Su-
preme Court for the second time, the Court accepted "as binding
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's construction of state homicide
law,"8 including the view that "malice aforethought connotes no
"s Id. at 664. Justice Wernick, in his concurring opinion, elaborated on this aspect of the
court's decision:
In the law of Maine "malice aforethought" is ... a fictional, metaphysical term
of art. It capsulizes, as a shorthand code phrase, not any substantively real factual
content but only the expression of the public policy judgment that homicides which
are rendered criminal by being committed in a specific manner-either by the
actor's having a specific subjective intention to have death result or by the high
objective tendency of his conduct to produce death-have attributed to them the
highest degree of blameworthiness for purposes of severity of punishment.
Id. at 672 (Wernick, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
11 Id. at 664. The Lafferty court was plainly upset that the First Circuit, despite the clear
language of Rollins, had chosen to adopt its own interpretation of Maine law, thus making
"itself ... the final arbiter of the internal law of the State of Maine," in defiance of the
general rule that federal courts do not have the power to authoritatively construe state
statutes. Id. See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).
11 Strangely, the Patterson court cited Lafferty to support its view that in Maine malice
aforethought constituted a substantive fact necessary to obtain a murder conviction. See note
61 supra. Where the Patterson court apparently went awry on this issue was in its view of
the relationship between express malice aforethought and presumed malice aforethought.
The Patterson court apparently believed that express malice aforethought had been rendered
useless in Maine because the substantive element connoted by that term, i.e., premeditation,
was implied in all instances of unlawful and intentional killings. As Rollins and Lafferty
indicate, however, the actual reason express malice is immaterial in that premeditation is
not required for a murder conviction under Maine law. See 309 A.2d at 664-65.
" 414 U.S. 1139 (1974).
"' Wilbur v. Mullaney, 496 F.2d 1303 (lst Cir. 1974), aff'd, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The First
Circuit held that Maine's presumption of malice aforethought was unconstitutional for essen-
tially the same reasons subsequently espoused by the Supreme Court. 496 F.2d at 1306-07.
1" 421 U.S. at 691.
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substantive fact (such as premeditation) but rather is solely a policy
presumption."'"
Comparison of the Maine and New York Murder Statutes
Based upon the foregoing, it is submitted that the Maine law
struck down in Mullaney and New York's homicide statute are, as
argued by the dissent in Patterson,2 functionally identical. Both in
Maine and in New York, all the substantive elements of murder
must be established by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
The sole factor that distinguishes murder from manslaughter in
both states is the existence of a negative-the absence of heat of
passion in Maine and the lack of extreme emotional disturbance in
New York. Neither mitigating factor rebuts any of the substantive
facts the prosecution is required to prove. Rather, both are "collat-
eral" to what the state has defined as the principal facts in issue,
and both are explanative of the circumstances under which the
defendant's intent was formed. 3 In both instances, the defendant is
required to prove the existence of this "collateral" mitigating factor
by a preponderance of the evidence.
The foregoing analysis belies the Patterson court's belief that
the burden of proof on issues "collateral" to those the prosecution
is required to establish as essential elements of the crime can be
placed upon the defendant without violating Winship principles.
Mullaney indicates clearly that the Court in Winship was not con-
cerned merely with the labels a state chooses to place upon those
factors that are critical to determining guilt or innocence or the
degree of criminal culpability.84 Whether a factor is defined in the
11 Id. at 689 n.9. The Court also noted that under the Maine court's interpretation of state
law, the same intent is required "for both murder and manslaughter, the distinction being
that in the latter case the intent results from a sudden provocation which leads the defendant
to act in the heat of passion." Id. This construction of Maine law cannot be reconciled with
the Patterson court's subsequent assertion that a showing of heat of passion on sudden
provocation renders a felonious homicide "less intentional," 39 N.Y.2d at 302, 347 N.E.2d at
907, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 584. See text accompanying note 59 supra.
52 See 39 N.Y.2d at 313, 347 N.E.2d at 914, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 589 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra; note 81 supra.
Judge Cooke impliedly took note of this when, comparing the two states' laws, he
observed:
[A]s the Supreme Court pointed out in Mullaney, the "malice aforethought"
specified in Maine's murder statute was not an element requiring objective proof
but only a policy presumption of the absence of heat of passion. While New York's
statutes do not mention malice as such, they make the absence of extreme emo-
tional distress an element of murder by distinguishing manslaughter from murder
only by the presence of extreme emotional distress. Thus nothing turns on the fact
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statute as a required element of the crime or is instead considered
"collateral" to liability is not determinative. Rather, the decisive
inquiry under Mullaney is whether the state, in allocating the bur-
den of persuasion in a criminal prosecution, offends the dual inter-
ests found critical in Winship-reduction of the threat of wrongful
convictions based upon factual errors and the fostering of respect for
the criminal justice system."
It is suggested that an analysis of section 125.25(1)(a) reveals
that New York's affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturb-
ance, like Maine's defense of heat of passion, is violative of the
principles espoused in Winship. To paraphrase Mullaney,6 New
York has chosen to distinguish between those who intentionally kill
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance and those
who intentionally kill in its absence. Because the former are consid-
ered less blameworthy," they may be convicted only of manslaugh-
ter in the first degree, a crime which carries a maximum sentence
of 25 years,88 while the latter may be convicted of murder, a crime
punishable by life imprisonment. Furthermore, it is apparent that
a defendant branded a "murderer" by the state suffers far greater
social stigmatization than one convicted of manslaughter. Conse-
quently, by refusing to require the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the sole fact upon which this substantial differ-
ence in potential loss of liberty and reputation turns, namely, the
absence of extreme emotional disturbance, New York has violated
the dictates of Winship. Rather than providing the defendant with
that Maine gives this absence of the emotional factor a name and New York does
not.
39 N.Y.2d at 313, 347 N.E.2d at 914, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 589 (citation omitted) (emphasis added)
(Cooke, J., dissenting). See also Gegan, supra note 6, at 576, wherein the author notes that
the effect of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance on New York's murder
statute is the same as the effect of the presumption of malice on murder at common law.
" See notes 15-17 and accompanying text supra.
" 421 U.S. at 698.
' See People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 303, 347 N.E.2d 898, 908, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573,
582, prob. juris. noted, 97 S. Ct. 52 (1976).
" Manslaughter in the first degree is a B felony under the Penal Law. See N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1975). A first-time felony offender convicted of a B felony may
receive anywhere from a 3 to a 25 year maximum sentence. Id. § 70.00(2)(b).
" Murder in the second degree is an A-1 felony. Id. § 125.25. The minimum period of
incarceration for an individual who has committed an A-1 felony is 15 years, id. §
70.00(3)(a)(i), while the maximum is life imprisonment, id. § 70.00(2)(a). In New York,
murder in the first degree, which covers the intentional killing of police and corrections
officers and intentional homicides committed by certain prison inmates, id. § 125.27, is
reduced to first degree manslaughter if the defendant can establish that he acted under the
influence of extreme emotional disturbance. Id. § 125.27(2)(a). A conviction for first degree
murder carries with it a mandatory death penalty. Id. § 60.06.
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the protection against an erroneous conviction which the constitu-
tionally required reasonable-doubt standard is designed to ensure,
New York presents a defendant in a homicide prosecution with the
possibility of a conviction for murder despite the fact that it is
equally likely that he is guilty only of manslaughter."
THE "UNIQUE HARDSHIP" EXCEPTION
Although the court of appeals did not consider the question in
Patterson, the Mullaney Court did not foreclose the possibility that
a state might still employ a burden-shifting device, such as an af-
firmative defense, if it could show that requiring the prosecution to
prove a particular fact critical to criminal culpability would consti-
tute a "unique hardship on the prosecution that would justify re-
quiring the defendant to carry the burden of proving [this] fact." 91
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not articulate what type of
hardship might be sufficiently compelling to outweigh the interests
voiced in Winship. Nevertheless, Mullaney does clearly indicate
that in the situation where a significant difference in potential loss
of liberty and social stigmatization turns on the existence of a par-
ticular fact, the burden of persuasion as to this fact cannot be
shifted to the accused merely because the fact is peculiarly within
the knowledge of the defendant and/or because proof of such fact by
the prosecution would require it to prove a negative.12
Although there are some differences in the burden placed upon
the prosecution by the Maine and New York provisions, it is submit-
ted that these differences are not sufficient to justify characteriza-
tion of the New York statute as falling within a unique hardship
exception. The heat of passion on sudden provocation defense pro-
vided by, the Maine murder statute contained two elements, one
subjective and one objective. The subjective aspect required that
the accused actually be acting under the influence of heat of passion
at the time of the killing.93 The objective element required that there
be adequate provocation, with adequacy measured from the view-
point of the "mind of a just and reasonable man .... "94 Similarly,
the New York murder statute contains both subjective and objective
elements. The subjective element requires that the defendant have
been in fact under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance
so Cf. text accompanying note 34 supra.
421 U.S. at 702.
22 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
" See State v. Rollins, 295 A.2d 920 (Me. 1972); note 24 supra.
" State v. Rollins, 295 A.2d 920, 920-21 (Me. 1972) (citation omitted).
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when he committed the homicidal act. The objective element re-
quires that a reasonable explanation or excuse for the emotional
disturbance exist, with reasonableness "determined from the view-
point of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstan-
ces as the defendant believed them to be.""5 Unlike the objective
aspect of Maine's law, the objective element of New York's statute
contains subjective factors." Thus, it might be argued that this
requirement places a sufficient additional strain upon the prosecu-
tion in New York to constitute a unique hardship which would jus-
tify shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
This contention, however, cannot withstand scrutiny under
Mullaney, since any increased hardship stems from the fact that the
prosecution is burdened with the necessity of proving facts particu-
larly within the knowledge of the defendant, such as the defendant's
belief concerning surrounding circumstances at the time of the kill-
ing. Difficulties such as these, based upon the proof of facts pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of the defendant, were expressly rejected
in Mullaney as being sufficient to constitute a unique hardship. 7 It
is therefore submitted that to require the prosecution to disprove
the existence of extreme emotional disturbance, even with its extra
subjective element, does not constitute a unique hardship which
would justify casting aside the reasonable-doubt standard. 8 As a
result, Patterson cannot be supported under the unique hardship
exception noted in Mullaney.
11 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(1)(a) (McKinney 1975). For a discussion of this aspect of
the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, see Gegan, supra note 6, at 571-
75.
96 Noting that extreme emotional disturbance is a broader term than its common law
predecessor, heat of passion, Judge Jasen stated in Patterson:
Traditionally, an action taken under the heat of passion meant that the defendant
had been provoked to the point that his "hot blood" prevented him from reflecting
upon his actions. Furthermore, the action had to be immediate . . . .An action
influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance is not one that is necessarily so
spontaneously undertaken. Rather, it may be that a significant mental trauma has
affected a defendant's mind for a substantial period of time, simmering in the
unknowing subconscious and then inexplicably coming to the fore.
39 N.Y.2d at 303, 347 N.E.2d at 907-08, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 582 (citations omitted). For further
discussion of extreme emotional disturbance, see People v. Shelton, - Misc. 2d -,..
-, 385 N.Y.S.2d 708, 712-15, 717-18 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976); Gegan, supra note 6, at
570.
V7 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
" See New York Affirmative Defenses, supra note 9, at 859-60.
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CHIEF JUDGE BREITEL'S CONCURRING OPINION: THE MAJORITY'S
RATIONALE?
In his concurring opinion in Patterson, Chief Judge Breitel ob-
served that it would be an abuse of affirmative defenses if used "to
unhinge the procedural presumption of innocence which historically
and constitutionally shields one charged with crime."9 The chief
judge warned, however, that although such abuses should be
guarded against, courts should not "be misguised [sic], out of ex-
cess caution, to forestall or discourage the use of affirmative defen-
ses . . . ."I" Chief Judge Breitel expressed apprehension that judi-
cial restriction of the legislature's ability to shift the burden of per-
suasion would discourage lawmakers from providing elements of
mitigation when enacting criminal statutes.10' Moreover, the chief
judge apparently feared that judicial intervention would encourage
legislators to repeal existing affirmative defenses rather than permit
courts to strike them down and convert them into ordinary defen-
ses. 
0 2
Chief Judge Breitel's misgivings were based upon the fact that
a legislature is presumably under no compulsion to include elements
of mitigation in a penal statute. Instead, it may choose to define a
crime as one general category of prohibited acts with the same basic
elements.' 3 By way of illustration, the chief judge cited the affirma-
tive defense of extreme emotional disturbance, noting that the legis-
lature could have chosen to define murder or manslaughter as re-
quiring only an intent to kill, without taking into consideration, as
a reductive factor, the emotional circumstances under which the
intent was formed."04
11 39 N.Y.2d at 305, 347 N.E.2d at 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 583-84 (Breitel, C.J., concurring).
' Id., 347 N.E.2d at 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
,o, Id. at 306, 347 N.E.2d at 910, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
"0 Id. at 305-06, 347 N.E.2d at 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 584. Prior to Patterson, when a New
York court found an affirmative defense to be violative of due process, the usual remedy was
to convert it into an ordinary defense. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 85 Misc. 2d 1, 4, 380
N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976); People v. Woods, 84 Misc. 2d 301, 305, 375
N.Y.S.2d 750, 754 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1975).
113Historically, the minimum elements which the prosecution has been required to prove
to establish criminal behavior are, "1. the occurrence of [a] social harm . . . 2. the defen-
dant's causal responsibility for the harm . . . 3. the fact of the defendant's intent to inflict
the social harm (or his negligent or reckless disregard . . . of that harm)." Fletcher, Two
Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal
Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 883-84 (1968).
"1 39 N.Y.2d at 305, 347 N.E.2d at 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 584 (Breitel, C.J., concurring).
Although Chief Judge Breitel's fears concerning the fate of affirmative defenses were based
upon the broad discretion a state legislature has in defining crimes, he apparently did not
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Whether or not Chief Judge Breitel's apprehensions are justi-
fied, it is clear that Mullaney implied that the interests sought to
be protected in Winship cannot be cast aside merely because the
state could have defined a crime without providing for an element
of mitigation. In Mullaney, the State of Maine argued that Winship
is inapplicable once the state has proven the elements required to
convict the defendant of a crime." 5 The state contended that it
could thereafter cast the burden of persuasion on the issue of heat
of passion onto the defendant. °" The Supreme Court, however, ex-
pressly rejected this contention, holding that conviction of a crime
does not, of itself, terminate the applicability of Winship.107 The
determinative factor, in the view of the Mullaney Court, was that
Maine had chosen to differentiate the punishment which could be
dispensed for commission of the two types of homicide defined
under Maine law. °8 By making the issue of heat of passion on sud-
den provocation the sole fact upon which such distinctions in pun-
ishment turned, without obliging the prosecution to prove the ab-
sence of that fact, the Maine statute was violative of due process.
Mullaney, therefore, was concerned not with how a state deter-
mines the substantive elements of a crime, but rather with what the
state does with the burden of persuasion after the crime has been
believe that shifting the burden of persuasion is justifiable with regard to all mitigating
factors. In discussing the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, the chief
judge, in addition to citing the legislature's power to define all intentional homicides as one
crime, referred to the relative fairness of placing the burden of proof on the defendant. Chief
Judge Breitel contended that placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant to show
extreme emotional disturbance is fair because of the accused's "knowledge or access to the
evidence other than his own on the issue." Id. On the other hand, requiring the prosecution
to disprove extreme emotional disturbance generally would be "unfair" in light of the difficul-
ties involved in establishing the existence of a negative. Id. at 305-06, 347 N.E.2d at 909, 383
N.Y.S.2d at 584. The chief judge thus employed a combination of two theories that had been
put forth in the past as justifications for shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant:
(1) the comparative convenience doctrine, discussed in notes 37-38 and accompanying text
supra; and (2) what has been termed the "fair compromise" theory. For a discussion of the
latter theory, see Osenbaugh, supra note 37, at 459-67. The crux of the fair compromise theory
is that since the state "could, and might otherwise, punish [certain] behavior without
providing any defense, it should be allowed to shift the burden [with respect to such defense]
on the accused as a compromise." Id. at 460. In United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 144
(1965), this theory was rejected as a means of upholding statutory inferences, discussed in
note 38 supra. The Supreme Court has never considered the "fair compromise" doctrine as a
standard for testing the constitutionality of an affirmative defense. See Ashford & Risinger,
Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79
YALE L.J. 165, 178 (1969).
"1 421 U.S. at 697.
106 Id.
" Id. at 697-98.
I" Id. at 698.
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defined.' 9 If placing the burden of persuasion upon the defendant
conflicts with Winship's dual interests, then, as in Mullaney, the
statute must fall, unless the amorphous unique hardship exception
is applicable.
Although there may be some merit to Chief Judge Breitel's
fears should Mullaney be interpreted too broadly, it should be noted
that Mullaney does not purport to condemn all burden-shifting de-
vices."" Certain affirmative defenses dealing with critical facts in
issue might still be upheld, perhaps by judicial balancing of the
hardship to the prosecution with the Winship interests involved,"'
or perhaps on some other ground not obvious on the face of
Mullaney, but which the Supreme Court will develop in future
cases."12
CONCLUSION
In Patterson, the New York Court of Appeals considered the
validity of a provision in the Penal Law which, on its face, appeared
constitutionally questionable in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Mullaney. Although the court of appeals was presented with
an opportunity to consider the interrelationship of Mullaney and
Winship as they affect New York's affirmative defense of extreme
emotional disturbance, the court chose instead to attempt to sal-
vage an affirmative defense which, by all indications, is unconstitu-
tional.
'" A similar conclusion was reached by Judge Moylan when, speaking for a unanimous
Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1975), he struck down a homicide statute similar to the one in Mullaney. There
he stated:
[Mullaney and Winship] are concerned exclusively with due process, the modality
or process by which we do certain things in the criminal law. They are concerned
with the criminal law's procedures and not with its substance. It is, therefore not
the definitions or elements of our various grades of felonious homicide that require
scrutiny under Mullaney v. Wilbur and Winship, but rather our mechanical, evi-
dentiary and procedural devices. The ultimate concern here is not with what we
do but with how we do it.
Id. at -, 349 A.2d at 323.
"I0 See People v. Long, 83 Misc. 2d 14, 17, 372 N.Y.S.2d 389, 392 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1975).
" See text accompanying notes 91-98 supra.
112 Even if a state may enact some affirmative defenses, Mullaney clearly indicates that
it cannot enact them for the reasons stated by Chief Judge Breitel, discussed in note 103
supra. That a defendant has better knowledge or access to evidence on a particular issue
and/or it is difficult for the prosecution to prove a negative were rejected in Mullaney as
sufficient cause for shifting the burden of persuasion. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text
supra.
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It is suggested that the Patterson court's decision upholding the
New York statute was premised in part upon a misinterpretation of
Maine law and a misreading of Mullaney. The decision cannot be
fully explained, however, merely by reference to the analysis em-
ployed by the court. Language in both the majority"' and concur-
ring opinions"' leaves little doubt that the court was motivated in
part by apprehensions concerning possible legislative reaction to
judicial invalidation of affirmative defenses.
Although the constitutionality of utilizing burden-shifting de-
vices in general in crimimal prosecutions is presently unresolved,
the Supreme Court, having accepted the appeal in Patterson, "5 has
the opportunity to confront the issues which have crystallized sub-
sequent to the Mullaney decision. Besides passing on the narrow
question of whether section 125.25(1) (a) is unconstitutional in light
of Mullaney, it is hoped that the Court will take advantage of the
occasion to define more clearly the circumstances, if any, in which
the state's interest in shifting the burden of persuasion as to a criti-
cal fact in issue is sufficiently compelling to overcome the vital
interests enunciated in Winship. Additionally, the Court should
clarify the significance, if any, of the "unique hardship" exception.
In so doing, the Court may dispel the vast confusion regarding af-
firmative defenses which has followed in the wake of Mullaney.
Claudio B. Bergamasco
1,3 The majority cited with approval Chief Judge Breitel's concurring opinion. 39 N.Y.2d
at 304, 347 N.E.2d at 908, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
"I See text accompanying notes 99-102 supra. Judge Jones, in a brief concurring opinion
in Patterson, urged judicial restraint in considering the constitutionality of affirmative defen-
ses. 39 N.Y.2d at 307, 347 N.E.2d at 910, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 585 (Jones, J., concurring).
11 97 S. Ct. 52 (1976).
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